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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to empirically show how the housework 
behavior of husbands and wives has changed based on data on wives in dual-
earner households obtained from the JPSC conducted by the Institute for Research 
on Household Economics in 1993, 2000, and 2007. The results show that the 
housework behavior of husbands in 2000 and 2007 is explained by the gender 
display model, while the housework behavior of wives is explained by the gender 
display model in 2000, but by the autonomy model in 2007.
In the United States, it is possible to empirically analyze changes in housework 
behavior over time by extracting samples within the lower and upper age limits 
of eighteen and sixty-five using long-term panel data from studies such as the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) conducted by the University of Michigan 
and the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) conducted by the 
University of Wisconsin. However, the JPSC was only first conducted in 1993, 
and the women in cohort A, who were the subjects of the survey when it was first 
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launched, were between ages twenty-four and thirty-four at the time, making it 
impossible for a positive analysis to be conducted between this survey and those 
conducted in the United States. In this study, I focus only on cohort A, and consider 
how the housework behavior of husbands and wives in the dual-earner households 
included in that cohort have changed.
Two key points must be noted in this study. First, when the husband’s relative 
income is used as the explanatory variable, it is important to note whether the 
housework behavior of husbands and wives is explained by the economic exchange 
model or by the gender display model. Ando (2011b) used individual data from the 
2007 (fifteenth) JPSC conducted by the Institute for Research on Household Eco-
nomics to show that husbands and wives both engage in gender displays regardless 
of the wife’s employment status. Second, when the absolute income of husbands or 
wives is used as an explanatory variable, it is important to note whether this ends 
up increasing or decreasing the time spent by husbands or wives on housework. 
Ando (2011b) shows not only that the absolute income of wives working full-time 
increases the time spent on housework by their husbands but also that it decreases 
their own time spent on housework hours.1
Previous Research
Relative Income Models
One can imagine that among factors determining the time spent on housework 
by husbands and wives would be the relative resources offered by each partner. 
One of those resources is their income, and one might expect that the spouse with 
relatively more income is going to spend less time on housework, while the other 
spouse, by contrast, who has relatively less income, is going to spend more time on 
housework. This is called a transaction exchange model, an economic dependency 
model, or a bargaining model, and it hypothesizes that the smaller the husband’s 
relative income, the more time he will spend, and the less time his wife will spend, 
on housework.
By contrast, the gender display model hypothesizes that the smaller the husband’s 
relative income, the more (less) time he (his wife) will spend on housework, but 
if his (her) marginally increased (decreased) housework time declines, or in some 
cases, if the husband’s relative income decreases below a certain threshold, the 
husband (wife) will either decrease the marginally increased (decreased) house-
work time, or will take steps to decrease (increase) the amount of time spent on 
housework itself. Brines (1994), who first operationalized the gender display model, 
used PSID wave twenty data to show that while the results of an empirical analysis 
related to the housework behavior of wives support the economic exchange model, 
the results related to the housework behavior of husbands are explained by the 
gender display model.2 Using NSFH data from 1987–88, Greenstein (2000) used 
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the husband’s relative income as the independent variable to show that the house-
work behavior not only of American husbands, but also of wives, is explained by 
the gender display model. Gender displays by husbands and wives are for gender 
deviance neutralization.
Bittman et al. (2003) conducted an empirical analysis using the same NSFH 
data from 1987–88 that was used by the Australian National Time-Use Survey 
(ANTUS) in 1992 and by Greenstein (2000). They compared the housework 
behavior of couples in Australia and the United States and showed that the 
housework behavior of Australian wives and American husbands is explained by 
the gender display model, and that the housework behavior of American wives is 
explained by the economic exchange model. They also showed that the house-
work behavior of Australian husbands is not explained by either model. Evertson 
and Nermo (2004) compared the United States and Sweden over multiple years. 
They conducted an empirical analysis of data from the Swedish Level of Living 
Survey from 1974, 1981, 1991, and 2000, and PSID data from the United States 
from 1973, 1981, 1991, and 1999. They showed that in Sweden, the housework 
behavior of both husbands and wives in all years was explained by the economic 
exchange model, but that in the United States, the housework behavior of wives 
in 1981, 1991, and 1999, and that of husbands in 1973 could be explained by the 
gender display model.
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) analyzed the housework behavior of husbands 
from the perspective of identity economics, and showed that if the husband’s 
share of work outside the home falls below 50 percent, his marginal increases 
in housework time will gradually decrease. When the husband’s share of work 
outside the home is extremely low, the graph becomes nearly flat along the hori-
zontal axis.3 Ando (2010) participated in a study conducted by the Meiji University 
Graduate School of Sociology conducted over three years from 2005 to 2007, 
titled “Theories and Empirical Analysis in Behavioral Economics.” He used data 
obtained from the first survey conducted in November 2005 to do an empirical 
analysis using husbands’ share of housework time as the independent variable, 
as did Akerlof and Kranton (2000), and showed that the housework behavior of 
Japanese husbands is explained by the gender display model. However, this study 
had several problems, including a small sample size of only 131 subjects and 
control variables consisting of only two categories for the age of the youngest 
child. Thus, Ando (2011b) used data from the fifteenth JPSC conducted by the 
Institute for Research on Household Economics in 2007, increased the sample 
size and number of control variables, and conducted the empirical analysis using 
the husband’s relative income as the independent variable and the housework 
time of husbands and wives separately as the dependent variables. The results of 
this analysis showed that wives working in non–full-time (hereafter, part-time) 
jobs and their husbands engage in gender display behaviors, while women with 
full-time jobs and their husbands do not.4
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Absolute Income Model
Gupta (2006, 2007) emphasized two points in analyzing the housework behavior 
of wives. First, using relative income as an explanatory variable assumes that the 
absolute incomes of husbands and wives have an effect with the same sign on 
the housework behaviors of wives. In reality, when those absolute incomes are 
incorporated as explanatory variables, their signs do not always match.5 Second, 
while the husband’s income is used for personal purposes, the wife’s income has 
a positive correlation with purchases of housework substitutes in the market. 
Since wives have a tendency to use their own income to reduce their housework 
behavior, a wife’s absolute income, not her relative income, should be used as an 
explanatory variable. Gupta calls this model the (female) autonomy model.
Gupta (2006) used data from the second wave of the NSFH to show that 
when the same model was estimated for all of the control variables, the absolute 
income of a married woman had a negative and significant correlation with her 
time spent on housework, while her partner’s absolute income had a negative, 
but insignificant correlation. Likewise, Gupta (2007) used data on the housework 
time of married women working full-time obtained from the second wave of the 
NSFH to show that their housework behavior is expressed by the gender display 
model when the wife’s relative income and the couple’s absolute total income 
are incorporated into the equation as independent variables. However, when the 
couple’s absolute income is incorporated separately as an independent variable, 
the gender display model no longer explains the wife’s housework behavior. 
Furthermore, if the wife’s relative income is removed from the equation, it turns 
out that the wife’s absolute income has a significant, negative correlation with 
her time spent on housework. Gupta (2009) sampled data on cohabiting or mar-
ried females working full-time from the 1999 German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP), the 2000 Swedish Level of Living Survey (LNU), and the 1999 PSID, 
and used it to estimate an economic exchange model, gender display model, 
and autonomy model. The results of that empirical analysis showed that while 
the gender display model cannot be completely rejected in Germany and the 
United States, the autonomy model explains female housework behavior in all 
three countries examined, including Sweden. Usdansky and Parker (2011) also 
conducted an empirical analysis of the autonomy model. They used pooled data 
from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) conducted from 2003 to 2006 to 
show that the absolute income of wives is significantly and negatively correlated 
with their time spent on housework.
Gupta’s autonomy model is used to explain the housework behavior of women, 
particularly married or cohabiting working women. In this study, given my belief 
in the possibility that the absolute income not only of wives but also of husbands 
influences their respective housework behaviors, I expand on this autonomy model 
to create a model that incorporates the absolute income of each partner separately, 
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as an independent variable.6 I call this the “absolute income model.” Ando (2011b) 
used this model to analyze the weekday housework behavior of married dual-earner 
households in Japan.
Ando (2011b) used wave 15 data from the JPSC to show that when a full-time 
working wife’s annual income increases by one unit (¥10,000), her time spent 
on housework decreases by about 0.18 minutes and her husband’s time spent on 
housework increases by about 2.2 minutes. Also, when a part-time working wife’s 
annual income increases by one unit (¥10,000), her time spent on housework 
decreases by about 0.42 minutes and her husband’s time spent on housework 
increases by about 0.12 minutes. By contrast, a husband’s absolute income has 
no effect on the housework time of either spouse, regardless of whether his wife 
works full- or part-time.
Analytical Framework
Model
This study, like Ando (2011b), estimates an economic exchange model, gender 
display model, and absolute income model, which is an expanded version of 
Gupta’s (2006, 2007, 2009) autonomy model, for husbands and wives in dual-earner 
households. Equation (1) was estimated for statistically confirming whether the 
housework behavior of husbands or wives is explained by the economic exchange 
or gender display model.
Model I: yi = α0i + α1iX + α2i X 2 + α3iZ + ε0 , i = 1, 2. (1)
Here, y is the housework behavior of husbands or wives, X is the husband’s 
relative income, Z is the control variable vector, ε0 is the error term, and i is the 
gender, with 1 used for males and 2 for females. The expected sign of α1i is 
negative for husbands and positive for wives. The term α2i expresses the curvi-
linearity effect, and the expected sign, again, is negative for husbands and posi-
tive for wives. If α1i fulfills the sign conditions and is significant, and α2i is not 
significant, the housework behavior of husbands and wives can be explained by 
the economic exchange model. If α1i and α2i both fulfill the sign conditions and 
are significant, or if α1i is not significant, but α2i meets the sign condition and is 
significant, the housework behavior of husbands and wives can be explained by 
the gender display model.
However, Model I assumes a strong correlation between X and X2, making it 
easy to imagine that multicollinearity might occur. Actually, Ando (2011b) showed 
that correlation coefficient between the two is extremely strong, exceeding 0.9. 
Thus, in this study, in accordance with Ando (2011b), I separately estimate Equa-
tions (2) and (3).
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Model II: yi = α0i + α1iX + α3iZ + ε0 , i = 1, 2. (2)
Model III: yi = α0i + α2iX2 + α3iZ + ε0 , i = 1, 2.  (3)
The absolute income model is expressed below in Equation (4):
Model IV: yi = β0i + β1hH + β1ww + β2Z + ε0 , i = 1, 2. (4)
where, H and w are the absolute incomes of husbands and wives, respectively.
In this study, I estimate these four models for both husbands and wives separately, 
and present the results of my empirical analysis.
Sample and Variables
The Institute for Research on Household Economics has been conducting the JPSC 
since 1993. In this study, cohort A consists of 1,500 women who were between the 
ages of twenty-four and thirty-four in 1993. I sampled married working women 
living with their husbands from the 2007 data, and excluded respondents who did 
not answer the question, respondents who responded “Not applicable,” couples 
in which either spouse was a student, and couples in which either spouse was 
retired or unemployed. After accounting for these factors, the sample consisted 
of 623 married working women between the ages of twenty-eight and forty-eight 
(248 of whom worked part-time and the rest of whom worked full-time). The 
ages of their husbands were between twenty-five and fifty-eight.
The dependent variable is the time spent by husbands and wives on housework 
(including child care) during the workweek, in one-minute increments. The in-
dependent variables in the economic exchange model and gender display model 
are the husband’s relative income and its square. By contrast, the independent 
variables in the expanded version of the autonomy model are the absolute incomes 
of each spouse. The control variables are (1) the time spent on work outside the 
home of each spouse, (2) the educational background of each spouse, (3) the age 
of each spouse, (4) the number of children, (5) the presence of a youngest child 
who is not yet enrolled in school, (6) the presence of a youngest child who is in 
elementary school, and (7) the employment status of each spouse.
According to the free-time hypothesis, if much of either spouse’s time is spent 
on work outside the home, their time allocated to housework will shrink, and 
the housework time allocated to their spouse will increase. Thus, the expected 
signs of the time spent working outside the home are negative and positive, 
respectively, for each spouse.
Because highly educated husbands and wives have been exposed to more 
years of gender-equality education at a higher level, they are more likely to reject 
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gender role divisions. Thus, husbands with a higher level of education will spend 
more of their time on housework, allowing their wives to spend less time on 
housework, and wives with a higher level of education will reduce the amount 
of time they spend on housework, requiring their husbands to spend more time 
on housework. The variables reflecting the educational background of husbands 
and wives are “the husband’s highest level of education” and “the wife’s highest 
level of education.” In accordance with the definitions of the JSPC, scores will be 
assigned as follows: a score of 1 will be assigned for those whose highest level 
of education is junior high school, 2 for those who did not graduate from high 
school, but graduated from a vocational school or specialized training school, 
3 for those who graduated from high school, 4 for those who graduated from 
high school and also graduated from a vocational school or specialized training 
school, 5 for those who graduated from a junior college or specialized program 
of higher education, 6 for those who graduated from a four-year university, and 
7 for those who completed graduate school.
Relatively older husbands and wives tend to support a division of labor 
based on gender roles, while relatively younger husbands and wives tend to 
have a stronger sense of gender equality and to reject a division of labor based 
on gender roles. Thus, relatively older husbands and husbands with relatively 
older wives spend very little time on housework. Also, relatively older wives 
and wives with relatively older husbands tend to spend more time on housework. 
However, husbands and wives seem to increase or decrease their participation 
in housework depending on their current stage in life, such that this kind of sign 
condition is not necessarily fixed.
For wives, the more children a couple has, the greater the amount of time she 
must spend on child care. Husbands, too, provide more help with their wives’ 
child-care tasks as the number of children increases. Thus, the number of children 
is expected to have a positive correlation with time spent on housework for both 
husbands and wives.
Since husbands and wives have to spend more time on child care while their 
children are very young, couples with youngest children who are not yet enrolled 
in school or who are in elementary school tend to spend more time on housework. 
Thus, having a preschool-age youngest child is assigned a value of 1, while not hav-
ing a preschool-age youngest child is assigned a value of 0. Having an elementary 
school-age youngest child is assigned a value of 1, while not having an elementary 
school-age youngest child is assigned a value of 0.
Further, to confirm whether the wife’s employment status has an effect on 
the coefficient of the explanatory variable, cross-terms derived from each ex-
planatory variable and the wife’s employment status have been included in the 
estimation equation.
The descriptive statistics of the sample based on the wife’s employment status 
are shown in Tables 1 and 2. I have compared the average values between years 
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for each of the following variables: husband’s housework time, wife’s housework 
time, husband’s work time, wife’s work time, husband’s annual income, wife’s 
annual income, and husband’s relative income.
Empirical Analysis
Descriptive Statistics
First, Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics on couples in which the wife works 
full-time. The average time spent on housework by husbands was 34.63 minutes 
in 1993, 43.82 minutes in 2000, and 28.03 minutes in 2007. There is no significant 
difference between these figures. By contrast, the average amount of time spent 
on housework by wives was 257.41 minutes in 1993, 188.17 minutes in 2000, and 
203.12 minutes in 2007. In this case, the differences between the average values in 
1993 and 2000, and between 1993 and 2007 are significant. However, the difference 
between the averages in 2000 and 2007 is not significant. While the husband’s time 
spent on housework increased only slightly, by 9.19 minutes, from 1993 to 2000, 
the wife’s time spent on housework decreased dramatically over the same period, 
by 69.24 minutes. However, while the housework time of husbands decreased by 
15.79 minutes from 2000 to 2007, the housework time of wives increased by about 
the same amount, 14.95 minutes.
The average work time increased slightly among both husbands and wives between 
1993 and 2007. Husbands spent 585.10 minutes working in 1993, 585.10 minutes 
in 2000, and 601.95 minutes in 2007, while wives spent 462.37 minutes working in 
1993, 501.28 minutes in 2000, and 504.91 minutes in 2007. The differences between 
the husbands’ averages for each year are not statistically significant. Among wives, 
on the other hand, the difference in averages is not statistically significant between 
2000 and 2007, but is statistically significant between 1993 and 2000, and between 
1993 and 2007. The average income of husbands rose between 1993 and 2007 along 
with their average age, from ¥4,212,600 to ¥5,449,900 and then ¥5,952,900. A 
comparison of the averages reveals that the differences between 1993 and 2000, and 
between 1993 and 2007 are statistically significant. By contrast, the average income 
of wives only rose from ¥2,850,000 to ¥3,811,800 from 1993 to 2000, and unlike 
that of husbands, actually dropped slightly to ¥3,353,400 in 2007. However, the only 
statistically significant difference is between the averages in 1993 and 2000.
The relative income of husbands was 0.60 in 1993 and 2000, and 0.64 in 2007, 
with no significant difference between those figures. While the average number 
of children was 1.24 in 1993, it rose to 2.03 in 2007, revealing an increase in the 
number of couples having second children. Couples with preschool-age children 
accounted for 61 percent of the total in 1993, but that proportion fell over time, to 
38 percent in 2000 and a slim 8 percent in 2007. While only 9 percent of couples 
had elementary school-age children in 1993, that figure rose to 31 percent in 2000 
but then fell to 27 percent in 2007.
wINTER  2012–13 15
Next, we look at the descriptive statistics for couples in which the wife works 
part-time. The average time spent on housework by husbands in these relationships 
gradually decreased between 1993 and 2007 from 27.07 minutes, to 22.97 minutes 
and then 18.15 minutes. This differs from the pattern seen among husbands whose 
wives work full-time. However, there is no significant difference between the aver-
ages from year to year. The average time spent on housework by wives in these 
relationships gradually decreased between 1993 and 2007 from 338.55 minutes to 
286.53 minutes to 268.49 minutes. The differences in the averages between 1993 
and 2000, and between 1993 and 2007 are significant, but there is no significant 
difference between 2000 and 2007. There were no major changes in the average 
time spent working outside the home of husbands, which was reported at 602.34 
minutes in 1993, 596.67 minutes in 2000, and 603.45 minutes in 2007. In fact, 
there are no statistically significant differences between any of these averages. 
The average time spent by wives working outside the home was about the same 
level in 1993, 332.91 minutes, as in 2000, 331.53 minutes, but rose significantly 
in 2007 to 355.98 minutes. The only significant difference in these averages is 
between 2000 and 2007.
The average income of husbands rises with their average age. It rose from 
¥4,545,500 in 1993 to ¥5,275,700 in 2000 and ¥5,902,100 in 2007. The differences 
between all of these years are significant. The average income of wives rose between 
1993 and 2007 from ¥736,400 to ¥890,300 to ¥1,105,200. The average incomes of 
wives in 1993 and 2000 are not significantly different, but the average income in 
2007 is significantly different from that in 1993 and 2000. The relative income of 
husbands remained virtually constant, at 0.86 in 1993, 0.85 in 2000, and 0.83 in 
2007, and there is no significant difference between any of these averages.
 The average number of children was 1.5 in 1993, but rose to 1.90 in 2000 
and 1.98 in 2007, suggesting that the number of couples having second children 
increased over this fourteen-year period. While the proportion of couples with 
preschool-age children was 59 percent in 1993, it fell as the children aged to 29 
percent in 2000 and 7 percent in 2007. While 21 percent of couples had elementary 
school-age children in 1993, that figure rose to 48 percent in 2000 but then fell to 
33 percent in 2007.
Results of the Empirical Analysis
Housework Behavior of Husbands
First, we look at which model explains the housework behavior of husbands based 
on the results of this empirical analysis.7 The results of my empirical analysis on the 
housework behavior of husbands in 1993, 2000, and 2007 using the Tobit models, 
as well as the cross-term estimation results are shown in Tables 3 to 8. In Table 3, 
none of the following variables are significant: the husband’s relative income in 
Model II, the square of the husband’s relative income in Model III, or the absolute 
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income of either spouse in Model IV. Likewise, significant results were not found 
for any of the cross-terms of the variables shown in Table 4. This shows that the 
housework behavior of husbands in 1993 is not explained by any of the three 
models, but is only governed by significant control variables.
Next, we look at the estimation results for 2000. The husband’s relative income 
is not significant in Model II of Table 5, nor is it significant in the cross-term 
estimation results in Model II of Table 6. This shows that the housework behavior 
of husbands in 2000 is not explained by the economic exchange model. On the 
other hand, the square of the relative income of husbands in Model III of Table 
5 has a significant negative correlation with the housework time of husbands. 
However, in the cross-term estimation results for Model III in Table 6, the square 
of the relative income of husbands is not significant and is not associated with 
the employment status of wives. Thus, there is no difference in the coefficients 
of husbands whose wives work full-time and husbands whose wives work part-
time. This suggests that the housework behavior of husbands in 2000 is unrelated 
to the employment status of their wives, but is explained instead by the gender 
display model.
The absolute income of wives in Model IV of Table 5 is not significant, but the 
absolute income of husbands has a significant, negative correlation with their time 
spent on housework. And it turns out that the estimation results of the Model IV 
cross-terms in Table 6 show that while the absolute income of wives is insignificant 
and unrelated to their employment status, the absolute income of husbands has a 
significant, negative correlation only among husbands whose wives work part-
time. Combining these data with the estimation results shown in Table 5 yields 
a coefficient for the absolute income of husbands of –0.166 (= –0.073 – 0.093). 
Thus, husbands in 2000 were able to reduce their time spent on housework by 
engaging in other work, and the decrease in housework time that was made pos-
sible by a single unit of income was larger for husbands with wives who worked 
part-time than for husbands with wives who worked full-time. Model II in Tables 
7 and 8 shows that the housework behavior of husbands in 2007 is not explained 
by the economic exchange model. The square of the relative income of husbands 
in Model III of Table 7 has a significant, negative correlation with the time spent 
on housework by husbands. In Model III of Table 8, only the square of the relative 
income of husbands whose wives work full-time is significant. Since the estima-
tion coefficient for that variable is –73.617, the coefficient of the square of the 
relative income of husbands with wives who work full-time in 2007 is –123.534 
(= –50.917 – 73.617).
This shows that the housework behavior of husbands in the same year is un-
related to the employment status of their wives, but is explained by the gender 
display model. Finally, Model IV of Table 7 shows that while the absolute income 
of husbands is not significant, the absolute income of wives has a significant, 
positive correlation with the husbands’ housework time. The estimation results from 
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Model IV in Table 8 show that regardless of their employment status, the absolute 
income of wives is significantly and positively correlated with their husbands’ 
housework time. Thus, the coefficients of the absolute income of wives working 
full-time and wives working part-time are 0.227 (= 0.112 + 0.115) and 0.222 
(= 0.112 + 0.110), respectively.
Next we discuss the control variables. In all years, the husband’s time spent on 
work outside the home is significantly and negatively correlated with his house-
work time. While time spent on housework was reduced by about 1.9 minutes for 
every 10 minutes husbands spent on work outside the home in 1993 and 2007, 
in 2000, the same 10 minutes reduced his time spent on housework by about 3.5 
minutes. However, the wife’s time spent working outside the home only had a 
significant correlation with the husband’s time spent on housework in 2007, when 
10 minutes of work outside the home by a wife would increase her husband’s 
housework time by about one minute. Neither the highest level of education of 
either husband or wife, nor the age of the husband had a significant correlation 
with the husband’s time spent on housework in any year. The wife’s age has a 
significant, negative correlation with the time spent on housework by husbands 
in 1993 and 2007, meaning that in both years, the older a wife, the shorter the 
amount of time her husband spent on housework. In 2000 as well, the wife’s age 
was negatively correlated with the time spent on housework by husbands, but 
this correlation is not significant even at the 5 percent level. Tables 3 and 5 show 
that the number of children and the time spent on housework by husbands had 
a negative but insignificant correlation in 1993 and a positive but insignificant 
correlation in 2000. However in 2007, a significant and positive correlation can 
be found between these two variables. Table 7 shows that husbands’ time spent 
on housework increased by about 11 minutes per child.
In every year, the presence of preschool-age children had a significant, positive 
correlation with the husband’s time spent on housework. The presence of one 
preschool-age child increased the husband’s time spent on housework by more 
than two hours in 1993, by about 80 minutes in 2000, and by about 48 minutes in 
2007. The presence of an elementary school-age child was only significantly and 
positively correlated with the husband’s time spent on housework in 1993, when 
the presence of one elementary school-age child increased the husband’s house-
work time by about 95 minutes. Husbands’ and wives’ employment status does 
not have a significant correlation with the husband’s time spent on housework.
Housework Behavior of Wives
Next we look at the results of the empirical analysis of the housework behavior 
of wives. The results of my empirical analysis on the housework behavior of 
wives in 1993, 2000, and 2007 using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method, as 
well as the cross-term estimation results are shown in Tables 9 to 14. Neither the 
husband’s relative income in Model II of Table 9 nor the square of that variable 
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in Model III is significant. The estimation results of the cross-terms of Models 
II and III in Table 10 also were not significant, indicating that the wife’s time 
spent on housework in 1993 was unrelated to her employment status and thus 
cannot be explained either by the economic exchange model or by the gender 
display model. The estimation results for Model IV in Table 9 show that neither 
the husband’s nor the wife’s absolute income is significant, indicating that the 
wife’s time spent on housework in that year cannot be explained by the autonomy 
model emphasized by Gupta (2006, 2007, 2009). Next we look at Table 11. The 
husband’s relative income in Model II, as well as the square of that variable in 
Model III, have a significant, positive correlation with the wife’s time spent on 
housework. Table 12 shows that the husband’s relative income in Model II and 
the square of that variable in Model III have a significant, positive correlation 
only when the wife is working part-time. This shows that the wife’s time spent on 
housework in 2000 is explained by the gender display model, and that the coef-
ficient of the husband’s relative income squared is 141.903 when his wife works 
full-time and 360.966 when his wife works part-time (= 141.903 + 165.063).
While the husband’s absolute income in Model IV of Table 11 has a significant, 
positive correlation with the wife’s time spent on housework, the wife’s absolute 
income is not significant. The cross-term estimation results shown in Model IV of 
Table 12 also show that the wife’s absolute income is insignificant and that the hus-
band’s absolute income is significant only when his wife works part-time. Thus, the 
coefficient of the husband’s absolute income is 0.110 when his wife has a full-time 
job and 0.240 (= 0.110 + 0.130) when she has a part-time job. Finally, the wife’s time 
spent on housework in 2007 is confirmed in Tables 13 and 14. The estimation results 
of Models II and III in Table 13 indicate that the wife’s time spent on housework 
in 2007 cannot be explained by either the economic exchange model or the gender 
display model. However, attention must be paid to the estimation results for Model 
IV. In Table 13, the husband’s absolute income is not significant. The same is true 
in the cross-term estimation results for Model IV of Table 14. By contrast, Table 13 
shows that the wife’s absolute income has a significant, negative correlation with her 
housework time. The cross-term estimation results for Model IV of Table 14 indicate 
that this estimation coefficient is significant only for wives who work part-time. This 
suggests that the wife’s time spent on housework in 2007 is explained by the autonomy 
model emphasized by Gupta (2006, 2007, 2009) and that the coefficient is –0.139 
for wives working full-time and –0.332 (= –0.139 – 0.193) for wives working part-
time. It also suggests that the explanation of the wife’s time spent on housework 
depends on whether she works full-time or part-time, regardless of the amount 
of her income, and that the coefficient is –0.139 for wives working full-time and 
–0.332 (= –0.139 – 0.193) for wives working part-time. Thus, even among wives 
making the same income, those in part-time jobs have been able to achieve greater 
reductions in their time spent on housework than those in full-time jobs.
Finally, we discuss the control variables. The only year in which the husband’s 
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time spent on housework has a positive correlation with the wife’s time spent on 
housework is 1993. In 2000 and 2007, even if a husband tried to work longer hours 
outside the home, his wife would not increase her time spent on housework. The 
wife’s time spent working outside the home has a significant, negative correlation 
with her time spent on housework in all years.
The reduction in the amount of a wife’s housework time achieved by 10 minutes 
of her work outside the home was about 8.8 minutes in 1993, about 3 minutes in 
2000, and about 4.8 minutes in 2007. This means that wives working outside the 
home had to do more of the housework in 2000 than they did in 1993, even if their 
time spent working outside the home was the same. The husband’s highest level of 
education had no bearing on the wife’s time spent on housework. The wife’s high-
est level of education did not have a significant correlation with her time spent on 
housework in 1993 or 2000, but in 2007, while there was a significant correlation, 
the sign was the opposite of what would be expected, indicating a positive cor-
relation. The wife’s age did not have a significant correlation with her time spent 
on housework in any year. The husband’s age also had no effect on the wife’s time 
spent on housework in 1993 or 2000, but in 2007, there was a significant but nega-
tive correlation between the two, opposite of the sign condition. The number of 
children was not significant in 1993, but had a significant, positive correlation with 
the wife’s time spent on housework in 2000 and 2007. The presence of preschool-
age children significantly increased the wife’s time spent on housework in 1993 
and 2000, but the significance of the correlation was lost in 2007. The presence of 
an elementary school-age child only had a significant, positive correlation in 1993.8 
Husbands’ and wives’ employment status are not significantly correlated with the 
wife’s time spent on housework.
Conclusion
In this study, I extracted a sample of dual-earner couples from cohort A of the 
Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers conducted by the Institute for Research 
on Household Economics in 1993, 2000, and 2007. I used their data to examine 
whether the housework behaviors of husbands and wives were explained by the 
economic exchange model, the gender display model, or the absolute income 
model in each year, and looked at how those explanations changed over time. The 
results showed that the housework behaviors of husbands and wives in 1993 were 
not explained by any of these models. The husband’s time spent on housework 
was determined by his time spent working outside the home, his wife’s age, and 
the presence of preschool-age and elementary school-age children. The wife’s 
time spent on housework was determined by both her and her husband’s time 
spent working outside the home as well as the presence of preschool-age and 
elementary school-age children.
The results in 2000 show that the housework behavior of both husbands and 
wives was explained by, from the relative income perspective, the gender dis-
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play model, and from the absolute income perspective, the husband’s absolute 
income. In 2007, the housework behavior of husbands was explained by, from 
the relative income perspective, the gender display model, and from the absolute 
income perspective, unlike 2000, by the wife’s absolute income. Also, the wife’s 
housework behavior could not be explained by the relative income models, either 
the economic exchange model or the gender display model, but could be explained 
by her own absolute income, that is, by the autonomy model. The housework 
behavior of neither husbands nor wives in any year is associated with the wife’s 
employment status. This suggests that the housework behaviors of husbands and 
wives in a single cohort change over time. In the case of husbands, it seems that 
increasing age is connected with gender display behaviors.
Particularly interesting is the effect exerted by the absolute income of husbands 
and wives. In 1993, neither variable had any effect on the time spent on housework 
by either husbands or wives. In 2000, however, the husband’s absolute income 
had a significant, negative correlation with his time spent on housework, and a 
positive correlation with his wife’s time spent on housework. That is, while the 
husband could reduce his own time spent on housework through his employment, 
he simultaneously could increase his wife’s housework time. By contrast, no 
matter how many hours a wife spent working outside the home, she was unable 
either to increase her husband’s housework time or to decrease her own housework 
responsibilities. In 2007, finally, it became possible for a wife to reduce her own 
time spent on housework, either because the husband’s absolute income lost its 
ability to reduce his housework time and to increase his wife’s, or instead because 
she became able to force her husband to increase his time spent on housework by 
pursuing her own career outside the home.
This suggests that from 2000 to 2007, a change took place in the power rela-
tionship between husbands and wives with regard to housework, via the incomes 
earned by each spouse in dual-earner households. Ando (2011b) confirms that in 
2007, the wife’s absolute income had a significant, positive correlation with the 
husband’s time spent on housework and a significant, negative correlation with her 
own time spent on housework. Viewed another way, this suggests that the govern-
ment should play a major role in efforts to correct the imbalance in time spent on 
housework in Japan, where women tend to do the greater share, and to help couples 
achieve a greater work–life balance, by promoting employment among women and 
increasing their income levels.
Notes
1. A weak negative correlation has been clearly demonstrated between the absolute 
income of wives with full-time jobs and the time spent on housework (coefficient –0.063, 
t-value –1.756).
2. However, the autonomy variable used by Brines (1994) was a dependency measure 
that divided the difference between the income of husbands and wives by the couple’s total 
income.
wINTER  2012–13 39
3. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) do not present the results of an empirical analysis, but 
argue that when the husband’s relative income is used as the independent variable, this kind 
of gender display behavior is more clearly evident.
4. Gupta and Ash (2009) show that the frequency of husbands with a relative income 
or share of work outside the home below a certain level, such as 0.3 or 0.4, is very low 
in the samples used in various previous studies, and express doubt about the notion that 
husbands are actually engaging in gender display behavior when the husband’s relative 
income or share of work outside the home is at this level. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) 
contend that the gender display behavior of husbands is derived from the loss of identity 
of both the husband and wife, but the authors do not empirically show this to be the case. 
Ando (2011a), in an effort to address this issue, showed that the research group studying 
Theories and Empirical Analysis in Behavioral Economics, a comprehensive research 
project carried out by the Meiji University Graduate School of Sociology, conducted a 
virtual experiment using the second survey done in January 2007, and found that under 
conditions where the husband’s share of work outside the home is very small, many 
husbands engage in gender display behaviors and many wives engage in behaviors that 
support those gender display behaviors. However, the results of this multiple comparison 
showed that under the hypothesized conditions, it is impossible to say for certain that 
the greater the sense of identity loss experienced by husbands, the smaller the share of 
housework they will perform, or that the greater the sense of identity loss experienced 
by wives, the smaller the share of housework that they will impose on their husbands. 
However, that study also showed that under the hypothesized conditions, husbands with 
the smallest sense of identity loss took on a greater share of the housework than other 
husbands, and wives with the smallest sense of identity loss made their husbands take on a 
greater share of the housework than did other wives.
5. Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) showed that the cash benefit given to mothers by 
the UK government in the late 1970s had a larger positive correlation with female clothing 
and children’s clothing expenditures than with male clothing expenditures. Brandon (1999) 
also showed a significant positive relationship between the absolute income of married 
mothers, regardless of whether they had full- or part-time jobs, and expenditures on goods 
and services for children.
6. Ross (1987), in an empirical study of the housework participation of husbands in the 
United States, showed that while the absolute income of the husband is positively correlated 
with his housework participation, the absolute income of the wife is negatively correlated 
with her husband’s housework participation. Oropesa (1993) used U.S. data from 1990 
to show that the odds of a wife spending money on housecleaning services, regardless of 
whether she is employed full- or part-time, is positively and significantly correlated with 
her absolute income. Cohen (1998) used data from 1993 to show that the absolute incomes 
of husbands and wives both have a positive, significant correlation with the rate of use of 
housecleaning services and the rate of dining out, but while the coefficients are about the 
same in the latter case, in the former case, the coefficient of the absolute income of the 
wife is about twice that of the absolute income of the husband. This suggests that there 
are differences between husbands and wives in the use of their own incomes on goods and 
services that are substitutes for housework.
7. Because it is easy to imagine that, as was shown in Ando (2011b), multicollinearity 
might occur in Model I, in this study, I determine whether the housework behavior of 
husbands and wives is explained by the economic exchange model or the gender display 
model only based on the estimation results of Models II and III. For more on the estimation 
of cross-terms, see Ai and Norton (2003), Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), and Norton, 
Hua, and Ai (2004).
8. The estimation results for Model I in 2000, shown in Table 11, indicate that the 
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presence of an elementary school-age child has a significant, positive correlation with 
the wife’s time spent on housework, but the narrative in this study is based only on the 
estimation results for Models II, III, and IV.
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